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1.1 Background to the study 
The protection of human rights was not given priority during the period when 
African States fought to be independent from colonial rule.1Africa’s first inter-
governmental organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), merely 
referred to human rights under the banner of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)in its founding instrument, the Organisation of African Unity Charter 
(OAU Charter).2This union of States was focused on the ‘right to self-determination 
of peoples in the context of decolonisation and apartheid and not on human rights’.3 
The OAU Charter, adopted by African States on 25 May 1963,did not contain 
provisions for the implementation and protection of human rights through an African 
human rights instrument or mechanism.It was not until 1981 that human rights were 
given African recognition through the adoption of the African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples’Rights(African Charter).4This instrument provides for the 
establishment of  bodies to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights,5the most 
noteworthy of which is the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
                                                          
1
G J Naldi The African Union and the Regional Human Rights system (The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights 2
nd
 The System in Practice, 1986–2006 M Evans & R Murray eds.) Cambridge 
University Press 2008 p.45. F Viljoen & E Baimu Courts for Africa: Considering the co-existence of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and The African Court of Justice Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 2004 22(2) at p.245. 
2
OAU Charter adopted on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Preamble of the OAU Charter 
paragraph 9 states: Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation 
for peaceful and positive cooperation among States. Article II(e) reads: ‘To promote international 
cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights’. 
3
M Du Plessis & L Stone (2007) A court not found? African Human Rights Journal 7 (2) at p.526. 
4
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5, 21I.L.M58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. The International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ)after the first African States became independent adopted a declaration 
on human rights with a court in January 1961 in Lagos, Nigeria. However, nothing came of it until 
1981. See G Baricako ‘The African Charter and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in 
M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter and Peoples’ Rights 2nd Ed. The System in Practice, 
1986–2006(2008) at p.1. 
5
See note 4 above African Charter; Preamble par.2 recalling Decision 115(XVI) of the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Governments at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 
17 to 29 July 1979 on the preparation of a ‘preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human 
and peoples’ rights’. 
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Rights(African Commission).6The African Charter is inspired by the UDHR and 
influenced by traditions and values of the African Society.7 
Embodied in this instrument is the African Commission,which emulates the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (United Nations Commission).8The United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) later succeeded the United Nations 
Commission.9 The African Commission is mandated to promote human and peoples’ 
rights and to interpret the provisions of the African Charter.10 Its role is largely 
investigative11 and to make recommendations12 on its findings on human rights 
violations communicated to the African Commission. Compliance with the 
                                                          
6
See note 4 above African Charter: Art. 30 ‘An African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
hereinafter called ‘the Commission’, shall be established within the Organisation of African Unity to 
promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa’. 
7
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at 
Palais De Chaillot, Paris on 10 December 1948. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
Resolution 217A(iii) of 10 December 1948. The preamble to the UDHR reads: ‘The General Assembly 
proclaims this Universal Declaration as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations … shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms 
and by progressive measures, national and international to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.’ http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 
09/10/2012). Also see note 1 above, Naldi at p.25. 
8
The Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations adopted a resolution during its 34th 
Session in 1978, calling on the Secretary General of the United Nations ‘to consider the possibility of 
providing the OAU with all necessary assistance with a view to facilitating the establishment of a 
Commission on Human Rights for Africa’ UN Resolution CHR, Res.24 (XXXIV) of 8 March 1978. The 
UN General Assembly organised a seminar in Monrovia, Liberia on the creation of a regional human 
rights commission in particular for Africa during September 1979. See note 4 above Baricako at p.4–
5. Also see M Mutua ‘The African Human Rights System’ A Critical Evaluation (2000) p.18. 
http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/MUTUA.pdf (accessed 14/01/2012). 
9
The United Nations General Assembly established the UNHRC by adopting resolution A/RES/60/251 
on 15 March 2006. The UNHRC is mandated to uphold the highest standards in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. The UNHRC adopted Res.5/1 on June 18 2007, to establish a Complaints 
Procedure to address the consistent patterns of gross violations of all human rights and all 
fundamental freedoms. The Complaints Procedure consists of two working groups, namely: the 
Working Group on Communications (WGC) and the Working Group on Situations (WGS). The UNHRC 
also employ Special Procedures as a mechanism to monitor human rights violations in specific 
countries or examine global human rights issues. These special procedures may comprise of 
individual experts called Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives or Independent Experts or 
Working Groups. http://www.ohchr.org/English/bodies/chr/complaints.hmt (accessed 26/02/2012). 
See note 8 above Mutua at p.15.  
10
See note 4 above African Charter , Art. 45 ‘(1)To promote Human and Peoples’ Rights…. (2) To 
ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights…. (3) To interpret all provisions of the 
…Charter…’. 
11
See note 4 above Art. 46 ‘The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of 
investigation…’. See R Murray ‘The Special Rapporteurs in the African System‘ The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 2nded. The System in Practice, 1986–2006 M Evans & R Murray (eds.) 
p.344. Also see B T M Nyanduga ‘Working Groups of the African Commission and their Role in the 
Development of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ’The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights 2nd ed. The System in Practice, 1986–2006 M Evans & R Murray (eds.) p.379. 
12
See note 4 above Art. 53: ‘While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government such recommendations as it deems useful’. 
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recommendations on its findings is not binding on the State Party, and there is no 
enforcement mechanism.13 
This fact has been the reason for severe criticisms of the African Commission by 
observers of African human rights.14 The African Commission is branded as a 
‘toothless bulldog that only barks but cannot bite’15by Udombana,while Peter argues 
that ‘[t]his commission has proved to lack any bite let alone a bark that is 
noticeable’.16Mutua finds the African Commission to be a disappointment, 
ineffectual, weak and impotent.17Wachira does not agree with these criticisms and 
argues that States are bound in terms of international treaty norms to comply with the 
provisions of the treaty. 
It was hoped that the African Charter would have followed the European and Inter-
American human rights systems in the establishment of a court with power to bind 
human violators to its judgments and impose an obligation on the countries 
concerned to comply with them.18This was done 23 years after the African Charter 
was adopted, when the African Human Rights Court was entered into force. This 
court from its very inception was on a shaky foundation when the African Union 
(AU)19 decided to merge the court with the AU’s own judicial organ, the Court of 
Justice. The structure of this merger is the subject of the thesis.  
  
                                                          
13
See note 8 above Mutua atp.20. See note 1 above Naldip.36. 
14
See note 1 above Naldi at p.25. 
15
N J UdombanaTowards the African Court on Human and People's Rights: Better Late than Never, 
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal (2000). 
16
C M Peter ‘The proposed African Court of Justice-Jurisprudential, Procedural, Enforcement 
Problems and Beyond’ p.122. East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights Vol 1(2) 1993. 
17
See note 8 above M Mutua general. Also see S SceatsAfrica’s New Human Rights Court: Whistling 
in the Wind?2009 p.4.www.chathamhouse.org (accessed 14/01/2012). 
18
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention) establishes the European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg. The 
European Convention is the oldest regional instrument on human rights. It was adopted by the 
Council of Europe on 4 November 1950 in Rome and entered into force: 3 September 1953. Art. 19 
established a European Commission on Human Rights (European Commission) and a European Court 
of Human Rights. The European Commission was made obsolete in 1998 with the restructuring of 
the Court of Human Rights. http//www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=365 (accessed 27/10/2011). The 
American Convention on Human Rights(Pact of San Jose’) adopted by the Organization of American 
States on 27 November 1969, San José, Costa Rica. Entered into force: 18 July 1978. Art. 33 
establishes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. 
19
 The African Union was established in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on 26 May 2001 and adopted in 
South Africa on 9 July 2002. See also note 41. On 9 September 1999 the Assembly of Heads of States 
and Governments of the OAU called for the establishment of the AU in what became known as the 
Sirte Declaration. See note 39. 
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1.2 The need for a Human Rights Court 
The African Human Rights System consists of the African Charter and the African 
Commission as the mechanisms entrusted with the task of promotion and protection 
of human and peoples’ rights. Included in this system is the Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 (entered into force in 
1974);the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1990 (entered 
into force in 1999);the Cultural Charter for Africa of 1976 (entered into force in 
1990);20and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa of 
2003 (entered into force in 2005).21 However, between 1986 and 2004, Africa did 
not have a continental Human Rights Court. In 2004 the OAU adopted the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Human Rights Court 
Protocol) on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights22 
(African Human Rights Court). 
The African Commission was the only mechanism to which human rights violation 
complaints could be addressed. In terms of the African Commission’s mandate, it is 
empowered to make recommendations to the violating State Party which are not 
enforceable or binding on State Parties, as mentioned above.23 
The consensus amongst African human rights observers is that the African 
Commission does not provide for the enforcement remedies or mechanism for 
encouraging and tracking States compliance with its findings or recommendations. 
This has contributed to the African Commission’s ineffectiveness.24Wachira, on the 
other hand, argues against this general sentiment of non-compliance with regard to 
                                                          
20
 C Heyns ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’Penn State Law Review 
[Vol 108:3 2004] p.683. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008. See note 3 above. See also 
note 1 Viljoen&Baimu at 246. 
21
 F Banda Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008 p.441; Also see J C Mubangizi ‘Some reflections on recent and current trends 
in the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa: The pains and the gains’ (2006)6(2) 
African Human Rights Law Journal at pp.148& 157. 
22
 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 9 June 
1998 – entered into force on 25 January 2004. To date 51 of the 53 African States are signatories. 
Cape Verde and Eritrea are not signatories yet. Of the 51 signatories only 26 States have deposited 
their instrument of ratification. 
23
 O C Okafor ‘The African Rights Systems: Activist Forces and International Institutions.’ Cambridge 
University Press (2007) p.78;G M Wachira ‘Twenty years of elusive enforcement of the 
recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A possible 
remedy’(2006)6(2) African Human Rights Law Journalpp.473& 487. See also note 21 above 
Mubangizi at p.148; J D Boukongou ‘The appeal of the African system for protecting human rights’ 
(2006)6(2) African Human Rights Law Journal at pp.277& 291. 
24
 See note 8 above Mutuap.25. 
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the African Commission’s recommendations and rulings by making a case that the 
States are bound by the nature of the treaty to which they are signatories. He argues 
that ‘states are bound to respect and implement them in view of the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties25 and 
article 1 of the African Charter’.26 
The importance of enforceable and binding decisions as opposed to 
recommendations is that State Parties can be held accountable for non-compliance 
and attract sanctions of some form as determined by the court or political institution 
under whose jurisdiction the State Party falls. 
The need for a Human Rights Court is conclusive, as argued by African human 
rights observers, in that human rights violators can be ‘brought to book’, be bound 
by the decision of the court, and be held accountable for non-compliance. Mutua, 
however, argues that ‘the mere addition of a court is unlikely by itself to address 
sufficiently the normative and structural weaknesses that have plagued the African 
human rights system since its inception’.27While this may be a valid point, it is not 
insurmountable and can be addressed. This does not deviate from the indisputable 
fact that a Human Rights Court is necessary for the protection and promotion of 
human rights in Africa, and to bind violators legally to comply with the findings of 
the court. The non-compliance provision of the African Commission’s 
recommendations is proof that it is not possible to compel violating States to 
conform to internationally acceptable human rights norms, and to provide 
compensation to victims. Another factor is that international human rights 
jurisprudence would be developed by the establishment of a continental Human 
Rights Court. This would be a beacon to guide regional and national Human Rights 
Courts, tribunals and forums. As an example, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (South African Constitution)28 enshrines a Bill of Rights that 
                                                          
25
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into 
force on 27 January 1980. See note 111. 
26
 See note 23 above Wachira general. 
27
 M Mutua ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights 
Quarterly 342. 
28
 Promulgated originally as Act 108 of 1996; renamed (together with all its amendment Acts 
promulgated at that point) by s. 1(1) of the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act 5 of 2005 effective 
27 June 2005. 
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empowers and obliges a court, tribunal or forum, when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, to consider international law.29 
The OAU recognised this need and established the African Human Rights Court, 
although it took years to come into force. The AU observed the continuance of the 
established African Human Rights Court but within a different format. This format is 
under scrutiny in this thesis. The path to the human rights court as proposed by the 
AU will be plotted by looking at the transition of the African continental courts. 
1.3 First African continental court - African Court on Human and 
Peoples’Rights 
In 1993 the General Secretary of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, stated that the time 
had come for an African Court on Human Rights to be established.30The Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a resolution in June 1994 at 
Tunis in Tunisia requesting the Secretary General to convene a Government of 
Experts’ meeting in conjunction with the African Commission, over the means to 
enhance the efficiency of the African Commission, and to consider in particular the 
establishment of an African Human Rights Court.31A draft Protocol was submitted to 
a meeting of government experts in Cape Town, South Africa in September 1995, 
and adopted at a meeting of Ministers of Justice in December 1997.The final draft 
was adopted in Burkina Faso in June 1998.This was followed by the adoption of a 
declaration by the first OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in April 1999 
in Grand Bay, Mauritius. The Grand Bay Declaration affirmed that the promotion 
and protection of human rights are matters of priority in Africa, and acknowledged 
that ‘the observance of human rights is a key tool for promoting collective security, 
durable peace and sustainable development’ in Africa. The conference recommended 
that ‘States formulate and adopt national action plans for the promotion and 
protection of human rights’. At the conference, it was requested that States ‘give 
consideration to the ratification of all major OAU human rights treaties, including 
UN Human Rights Conventions’.32The establishment of the African Human Rights 
Court caused observers of the African human rights system to comment on its 
                                                          
29
South African Constitution Bill of Rights Section 39(1). ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum … (b) must consider international law’.  
30
 See note 23 above Wachira at p.7. 
31
 See note 4 above African Charter Preamble. 
32





mandate to protect and promote human rights. Matua believes that the African 
Human Rights Court is an attempt to address some of the weaknesses of the African 
system,33 and argues that unless State Parties revisit the African Charter on Human 
Rights and strengthen many of its substantive provisions,‘[t]he African Human 
Rights Court is condemned to remain a two-legged stool’.34 
Not all African human rights observers or organisations share this view.35The 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (ATP) believes that the adoption of the 
Protocol is an important step in building up the African system for the protection of 
human rights.36Wachira commented that ‘[a]lthough member states of the OAU had 
yielded and accepted that an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was a 
prerequisite to an effective human rights protection mechanism, they remained 
guarded and they were equally determined to frustrate its functioning’.37 
The African Human Rights Court is a positive step for the protection and promotion 
of human rights. The broad interpretation of the African Charter by the African 
Commission has addressed many of the concerns raised by African human rights 
commentators and has provided the third leg to stabilise the African Human Rights 
Court. The recommendations made by the African Commission over the years have 
evolved to the extent that observers of African human rights have commented 
that‘the Commission has contributed to the emergence of a dynamic and objective 
conception of the African law of human rights’.38 The African Human Rights Court 
is the only continental Human Rights Court in operation, and as such must be 
supported by the AU and States alike to be effective in the promotion and protection 
of human rights until the coming into force of the AU structured court. 
1.4 Second African continental court –Court of Justice of the African 
Union(Court of Justice) 
                                                          
33
 See note 8 above Mutua at p.26. 
34
 See note 8 above Mutua at p.39. 
35
 See note 23 above Okafor at p.78. 
36
 Occasional Paper: The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Association for the Prevention 
of Torture 2000 http://www.apt.ch (accessed 17/06/2012). The APT is an international NGO based in 
Geneva, whose mandate is the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment and serious human rights violations in general. APT holds a consultative status with 
ESCOSOC of the UN and with the Council of Europe, observer status with the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
37
 See note 23 above Wachira at p.13. 
38
 See note 23 above Boukongou at p.277. 
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The challenges posed by globalisation and the need to promote the socio-economic 
development of Africa convinced the OAU to disband in favour of a new 
organisation.39 The AU was constituted in order to replace the OAU and to take up 
the multifaceted challenges that confront Africa and its peoples in light of the social, 
economic and political changes taking place globally.40The founding instrument of 
the AU, the Constitutive Act of the African Union41(Constitutive Act),in contrast, 
includes the protection and promotion of human rights in its preamble and 
objectives, while the OAU Charter does not, as mentioned earlier. Sonia Sceats aptly 
observes that the Constitutive Act ‘represents an almost seismic shift since the days 
of its predecessor body, the Organisation of African Unity, which was committed to 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states and rarely engaged with human rights 
issues’.42 
The Constitutive Act provides for the establishment of a Court of Justice.43The 
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union44(Court of Justice Protocol) 
declared this court to be the principal judicial organ of the AU.45The Constitutive 
Act makes mention of the African Charter in its Objectives, Article 3(h).The already 
established African Human Rights Court is not mentioned in the Constitutive Act. 
The sources of law to which the Court of Justice may have regard in Article 20 of the 
Court of Justice Protocol do not include the African Charter. There is no mention of 
a relationship between the Court of Justice and the African Human Rights Court in 
the Court of Justice Protocol. However, the Assembly of the AU may indirectly 
confer power on the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction over human rights 
violations.46The Court of Justice has 43 State signatories of the potential 54 African 
                                                          
39
 The Heads of States and Government issued a declaration on 09/09/1999 calling for the 
establishment of the African Union, the Sirte Declaration. http://www.au.int/en/ (accessed 
22/10/2012). 
40
 See note 15 above Udombana at p.853. 
41
 The Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000, entered into 
force on 26 May 2001 with all 54 African States as signatories and 54 instruments of ratification 
being deposited. http://www.achpr.org (accessed 03/10/2011). The 54th State is South Sudan. 
42
 See note 17 above Sceats at p.3. See also note 1 above Viljoen&Baimu at p.247; see also the 
Constitutive Act Preamble and Arts. 3 and 4. 
43
 See note 44 Constitutive Act Art. 5(1)(4). 
44
Adopted by the 2
nd
 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Maputo on 11 July 
2003. 43 of 54 States are signatories and 16 States have deposited their instruments of ratification. 
http://au.int/en/treaties (accessed 18/10/2012).  
45
 See note 44 above Court of Justice Protocol Art. 2(2) The Court shall be the principal judicial organ 
of the Union. 
46
 See note 44 above Court of Justice Protocol Art. 19(2) The Assembly may confer on the Court 
power to assume jurisdiction over any dispute other those referred to in this Article. 
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States.47 As at 18 October 2012 only 16 State Parties had deposited their instruments 
of ratification, but nonetheless this sufficed for the Treaty to be entered into 
force.48The Court of Justice is currently in a state of limbo and the appointment of 
judges to the court has been suspended pending the outcome of the proposed merged 
court. 
1.5 Third African continental court–African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights(Merged Court – CJHR) 
The Court of Justice and the African Human Rights Court were merged to establish 
the Court of Justice and Human Rights49(Merged Court). The Merged Court is 
structured to consist of two Sections, General Affairs and Human Rights. The 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute has not received the required number of 
ratifications to be entered into force at the time of writing of this thesis. 
It was during the deliberations on the draft Court of Justice Protocol that it was first 
mooted that the African Human Rights Court be integrated as a special chamber of 
the Court of Justice. This was rejected by the Executive Council of the African 
Union, who decided that ‘the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights shall 
remain a separate and distinct institution from the Court of Justice of the African 
Union’.50As referred to above, this changed in 2004 and will be more fully addressed 
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Ordinary Session of the Assembly of heads of State and Government , held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt 
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1.6 Fourth African continental court –African Court of Justice and Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Draft Amending Merged Court (Tri-Sectional 
Court) (ACJHPR) 
Government experts and members of justice met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 
2012 to discuss the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights(Draft Amending Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute). This instrument provides for the change of the name of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights to the African Court of Justice and 
Human and Peoples’ Rights51(ACJHPR). The significant amendments include the 
Court’s jurisdiction, which is described as a court of first instance and of appeal.52 
The ACJHPR is vested with international criminal law jurisdiction and includes 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of unconstitutional 
change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenary practices, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous 
waste, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and aggression.53The Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute further provides for judges to be elected on a full-
time basis, with the court being structured into three Sections, the General Section, 
the International Criminal Law Section, and the Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Section.54The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute attempts to rectify 
the lacunae in the Merged Court Protocol and Statute by including the following 
clauses: the relationship between the African Commission and the Merged Court,55 
definition clause and amendment clauses to the Protocol.56An addition in the Statute 
of an ‘equitable gender representation’ clause in the composition of the Court was 
made.57 A striking feature of the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute 
is that the number of judges remains the same as in the Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute, but only five will be appointed to the Human Rights Section, and not eight 
as originally provided for.58 Access to the court with regard to individuals and non-
governmental organisations is restricted to only African individuals and African 
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organisations with observer status with the AU or its organs or institutions. The 
ratification of State Parties is still a requirement for direct individual access to the 
Merged Court.59 
1.7  Conclusion 
The plotting of the four African courts demonstrates the uncertainty of the AU’s 
plans to find the right format for the final African Human Rights Continental Court. 
At present, the African Human Rights Court is the only continental court in 
operation. The Court of Justice is in limbo, while the other two courts wait in the 
wings. The continued existence of the African Human Rights Court and the Court of 
Justice in their present form will come to an end as soon as one of the merged courts 
enters into force. This thesis discusses the enabling Protocols of the latter two courts, 
the Merged Court Protocol and the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute against the backdrop of the African Human Rights Court Protocol, to 
determine the plight or advancement of the protection and promotion of human 
rights within the Merged Court structure. 
1.8 Problem statement 
This thesis investigates the promise of the African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as the preferred judicial mechanism for the effective protection of 
human rights in Africa. The study seeks to find an answer to the question of which is 
the appropriate judicial structure to promote and protect African human rights in 
Africa. It is yet to be seen whether human rights will best be served by an 
independent Human Rights Court, or a court that is integrated with other facets of 
law such as that proposed by the Merged Court of the AU, or ultimately by the Tri-
Sectional Court. The AU, while trying to find the right mix, has landed in a tangle 
with the possibility of two courts being adopted and operating concurrently before 
the finalisation of the proposed judicial forum. This thesis has a bias towards human 
rights and will analyse the proposed human rights court structures to determine the 
suitability of the judicial forum that will best protect and promote human rights in 
Africa. 
The AU has placed itself in a peculiar position with regard to the establishment of a 
single continental court to preside over general issues, international crimes and 
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human rights.60This is unprecedented in international judicial systems, and 
specifically where human rights are integrated with international crimes. Since 
entered into force, the African Human Rights Court has metamorphosed into the 
Merged Court with two Sections, and before it can get off the ground, a Draft 
Amending Merged Court with three Sections is being proposed. The AU provides 
for each phase of the court to become operational separately. In addition the Court of 
Justice is presently in the position of accepting nominations for judges. The Merged 
Court Protocol and Statute has received 27 signatories and five ratifications.61The 
African Human Rights Court Protocol received 51 of the possible 54 signatories and 
of these,26 Member States deposited their instrument of ratification, entering it into 
force. In light of the aforementioned, the enabling instrument of the Merged Court 
must provide for the transition from the existing courts at the time of the merger into 
a single Merged Court. The AU has created a problem by breathing life into more 
than two judicial institutions from which it may take many years to recover. This 
could have a detrimental effect on the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Africa. 
African States have unanimously accepted the AU and the African Human Rights 
Protocol. The same cannot be said when it came to ratifying the African Human 
Rights Court, although it is operational. Despite this, the AU has proposed the 
merger of the African Human Rights Court by accepting the reasons forwarded by 
some Member States. The AU must take cognisance of those reasons tabled and 
those against the merger, so as to gain the confidence of those States that remain 
undecided. 
Observers of African human rights have warned that a danger exists in the African 
Human Rights Court being relegated to the periphery in the event that the merger is 
ratified.62They identified areas of concern such as the AU’s failure to consider the 
legal and political implications of the merger;63that the AU is not legally bound by 
the African Charter on Human Rights;64that only conditional access by civil society 
                                                          
60
 See note 51 above at Art. 5(1)(d). 
61
 African Union http://www.au.int/en/treaties (accessed 18/10/2012) The five States that ratified 
the Protocol are Libya & Mali in 2009 Burkina Faso in 2010 Benin & Congo in 2012. 
62
 See note 1 above Viljoen&Baimu at p.254. 
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organisations and individuals were provided for;65the relationship with the African 
Commission; gender equality in the composition of the Court;66and the relationship 
between the Courts of Justice and Human Rights and the courts of the regional 
economic communities.67 The thesis will draw from these comments and analyse the 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute against the Draft Amending Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute to determine to what extent they have addressed the concerns 
raised so as to determine the suitability of the Merged Court as the appropriate 
mechanism to promote and protect African Human Rights. 
 A study of the Draft Amending Merged Court structure will be targeted against the 
backdrop of the African Human Rights Protocol and the Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute to determine to what extent the structure of the Merged Court provides for 
the protection and promotion of human rights. Secondly, in so doing, the study will 
answer the question on the implications of including the International Criminal Law 
Section, and the effect this would have on the promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights in Africa. 
1.9 Research methodology and objectives 
Primary analysis will be undertaken on key structural elements in the relevant 
enabling Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
and the proposed amendments to it, to confirm or dispel the promise of the African 
Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights to protect human rights.  
Secondly, it would be necessary to establish if such requirements have indeed been 
met in order to give effect to the amendments. This will be achieved by a study of 
the relevant provisions in the enabling instruments that provides for the merger of 
the courts into one mechanism and the procedures that need to be followed to make 
it possible against the backdrop of international treaty law. 
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With regard to African human rights, research on information provided by the 
African Union and the African Commission on the African Charter and the 
Constitutive Act, will be undertaken through use of their websites and the University 
of Cape Town’s library. The study will draw upon the enabling treaty of the African 
Human Rights Court, as well as other international human rights instruments from 
the American and European Human Rights systems in order to acquire insight into 
the operation of those Human Rights systems. 
Secondary desktop research will be undertaken on African Law websites of various 
institutions of learning and other organisations. Existing doctrinal literature on the 
various mechanisms created by the aforementioned instruments will be extracted 
when searching the Internet sites. Articles and journal publications of various 
academic writers and observers on the subject and reports from government and non-
governmental organisations will be researched. Books published by African human 
rights observers, obtained from the UCT Law Library, will also be researched. 
1.10 Literature review 
Observers of the Human Rights systems have responded with arguments for and 
against the merger and have advanced their thoughts as to the structure the merger 
should embrace. 
Kindiki68 argues that there are two identifiable ways in which the merger could be 
achieved. The first is the integration of physical and financial resources. This mode 
of merger would require the sharing of all resources including the building and 
operational facilities such as libraries and information technology. However, Kindiki 
warns that this form of merger would not necessarily reduce operational costs or 
personnel by simply locating two separate courts in one building. What this form of 
merger does do is obviate the need to amend or abrogate the existing protocols to 
bring about the merger, as the two courts will remain independent, with separate 
registries operating from the same building. 
The second mode of merger sees the complete fusion of the two courts and 
management into one unified court. This fusion entails having personnel including 
judges serving both mandates of the court: general and human rights agendas. The 
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one drawback of this mode of merger is that it requires the amending of the existing 
protocols of the two courts and the likely disruption of the already operational 
African Human Rights Court. The advantage that this mode of merger offers, argues 
Kindiki, is that it would lead to great reduction of personnel and cost requirements. 
This mode of merger as presented by Kindiki is the preferred option. He goes further 
and recommends that the Human Rights Court should be subsumed into the Court of 
Justice to create a single court. In support of this, he reasons that the broad mandate 
of the Court of Justice includes the handling of human rights issues in terms of the 
objective and principles of the AU Constitutive Act. Furthermore, international law 
embraces human rights as a branch thereof and experts are required to have some 
knowledge of human rights. Finally, the different stages of development of the two 
courts can be surmounted by the political will of the Member States. 
Viljoen and Baimu69 argue that it makes sense to have one judicial body to mediate 
disputes arising from increasing political and regional co-operation. While they 
agree with Kindiki on the aspect of the broader mandate of the Court of Justice, they 
contend that unlike the African Human Rights Court, the Court of Justice does not 
have an explicit human rights mandate. This, they argue, poses the danger that if the 
African Human Rights Court is absorbed by the Court of Justice even as a chamber, 
human rights issues run the risk of being relegated to the periphery.  
Other human rights observers such as Udombana70 argue that the AU should 
establish a Court of Justice ‘capable of addressing the myriad of problems 
confronting the continent’. In opposition to a merger of the two courts, he proposes 
that ‘one court should give way for the other’. Udombana proposes that the Court of 
Justice be divided into three specialised chambers. To one chamber could be 
allocated general issues such as matters of international economic law. A second 
chamber would deal with human rights matters and a third chamber with 
environmental and international criminal law. Udombana supports his argument on 
the chamber system based on the structure of the International Court of Justice. 
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Boukongou71 holds a similar view to that of Udombana and envisages a court with 
three main Sections. He bases his structure of the court on the model of the 
International Court of Justice, with a Section dealing with general issues, such as 
disagreements between States; a Section on human rights, based on the model of the 
European Court of Human Rights; and a Section for criminal proceedings, based on 
the model of the International Criminal Court. This last Section, he argues, will 
address issues such as crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, crimes of 
aggression, and war crimes. Boukongou argues that each of the Sections could have 
‘functional autonomy, its own rules of procedure, its specialised chambers and its 
internal organisation in accordance with its mandate’. Furthermore, he argues that 
certain judges, according to their expertise, could preside over more than one 
Section. 
While many observers of human rights tend to be in agreement with the concept of a 
merging of the two courts, there remain certain misgivings about the legal process 
followed by the AU in amending the existing protocols. 
Kane and Motala were among the first to point to the failure of the AU to consider 
the legal and political implications of the proposed Merged Court.72They have 
questioned the creation of the Merged Court from the time it was conceived.73In their 
critique on the decision to merge, they argue that the process of the merger is flawed 
in that it is not grounded on solid legal foundations. In support of this claim, they 
argue that the provisions in the two protocols for establishing these courts in terms of 
amendments to the protocols does not allow for the AU Assembly to propose and/or 
make amendments to these protocols, and questions the authority of the AU 
Assembly to amend or vary multilateral treaties in the manner envisioned(to amend 
the two protocols through the adoption of a new protocol). 
Kindiki and Boukongou are in agreement with Kane and Motala in questioning the 
abrogation of one treaty by ratifying another treaty, where the State Parties to the 
two treaties are not the same.74The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
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Statute, argues Viljoen, is built on legal drift sand. Viljoen questions the legality of 
amending a protocol that is not in force.75 
There does not appear to be an abundance of literary discourse that addresses 
implications on the draft proposal to have the two chambers of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights transformed to a three chamber African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, this new development by the AU will 
impinge on the study to determine structural issues surrounding the inclusion of the 
international crime chamber to the proposed Draft Amended Merged Court, and the 
promise thereof  for the promotion and protection of human rights. In addition, this 
thesis will examine the concerns raised by political observers on the inclusion of an 
international crimes chamber to the court. 
1.11 Structure of thesis 
Chapter One introduces the study by chartering the direction of the African Human 
Rights System as planned by the AU to merge the African Human Rights Court with 
the Court of Justice. In so doing, the chapter points out the problem created by the 
AU in bringing into operation more institutions to compete for limited resources. 
Proliferation of courts is one of the reasons that the AU proffered for the merger, and 
yet it adds to the alleged problem despite the fact that it may not be a permanent 
situation. It also defines the merger structures argued by African human rights 
observers. Finally, Chapter One sets out the questions it seeks to answer in this thesis 
and how information will be gathered to achieve this to arrive at an informed 
conclusion. 
Chapter Two examines the arguments for and against the merger and investigates 
how the AU addresses them in the enabling instruments. It engages with the reasons 
for and against the merger and cross-references it with the concerns raised by 
observers of African human rights. This analysis is undertaken to determine the 
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extent to which it has influenced the AU in proposing the merger of the courts in its 
present format. The chapter also introduces the inclusion of the international crimes 
chamber to the present structure of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
Court. The purpose of this investigation is to determine the effect this inclusion 
would have on the Human Rights Section as proposed in the Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute. An analysis of the reasons for and against the 
merger will influence the outcome of this thesis in its determination of the preferred 
structure of the Human Rights Court to protect human rights. 
Chapter Three discusses the structure of the Merged Court by analysing the source 
documents and mechanisms created to protect human and peoples’ rights. The Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute will be analysed against the backdrop 
of the preceding protocols(African Human Rights Protocol and Merged Court 
Protocol) on the pertinent Sections that impinge on the structure of the Human 
Rights Section of the Merged Court. The micro- and macrostructure of the Merged 
Court will be discussed. The discussion will include the composition of the court; the 
qualifications, election and term of office of the judges; and the Sections and 
Chambers of the Court. The discussion will also focus on issues that have a bearing 
on the structure such as access to the court; the nature of judgments and 
implementation mechanisms; jurisdiction;and applicable law. Factors external to the 
Merged Court will be touched on that will indirectly filter upwards to impact on the 
structure of the Merged Court. In the final analysis of the structure, focus will 
primarily be directed to assisting in the determination of the structure that will be in 
the best interest for the protection of human and peoples’ rights. The discussion will 
commence with the transitional provisions affecting the structure of the Merged 
Court as it sets the tone for the structure of the Court. 
Chapter Four draws a conclusion from the facts of the investigation in the preceding 
chapters on the proposed Draft Amending Merged Court structure as the preferred 
court for the protection and promotion of Human Rights. Finally, it puts forward 





SINGULARITY OR DUALITY OF COURTS FOR THE PROTECTION AND 
PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two examines the arguments for and against the merger made by observers 
of the African Human Rights System. It investigates how the AU addresses them in 
the enabling instruments. This analysis is undertaken to determine the extent to 
which it has influenced the AU in proposing the merger of the courts in its present 
format. The chapter also introduces the inclusion of the international crimes chamber 
to the present structure of the African Court of Justice and the Human Rights Court. 
The purpose of this investigation is to determine the effect this inclusion would have 
on the Human Rights Section as proposed in the Draft Amending Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute. ‘The amendment on the merged protocol to include 
international crimes would severely infringe the composition and operation of the 
human rights Section of the ACJHPR’, argues FransViljoen.76Arguments such as 
this made by Viljoen make an analysis of the reasons for the merger necessary. 
The study in this chapter will influence the outcome of this thesis in its determination 
of the preferred structure of the Human Rights Court. Commentators and observers 
of the African human rights hold mixed views on the proposal to have one judicial 
institution with jurisdiction over the African continent,77as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The idea of the merger of the African Human Rights Court with the Court of 
Justice was mooted by the AU. Some of the reasons for and against the decision to 
merge the two courts will be examined below. 
2.2 Reasons for and against the merger of the two courts 
2.2.1 Arguments for singularity of courts 
Some observers of African human rights put forward reasons why they supported a 
merger of the two courts which included among others : the simplicity of a single 
court; a single court would avoid splitting human and financial resources while 
maintaining two courts; and the proliferation of human rights institutions would 
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likely have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the efforts to promote and 
protect human rights on the continent in that the courts with overlapping mandates 
could give rise to a risk of conflicting jurisprudence on human rights. Juma proffers 
additional reasons of note: that proliferation of courts could lead to ‘fragmentation of 
international law’, producing conflicting judgments and forum shopping. 
Furthermore, economic matters cannot be isolated from human rights, and therefore 
the Court of Justice and the African Human Rights Court will inevitably overlap in 
the future.78 
Observers of the African Human Rights system credit former President of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, with being instrumental with regard to the merger, after the 
African Human Rights Court had not received sufficient nominations for candidates 
to assume the office of judges.79Obasanjo cited similar concerns to those of other 
observers of African human rights in support of the merger. He stated that the lack of 
funds and the proliferation of organs of the African Union were the two foremost 
reasons.80 
The reasons that instigated the merger were heard and acted upon by the AU 
Assembly only after President Obasanjo’s utterances, despite the fact that similar 
reasons had been tabled by the Legal Council earlier and rejected.81 
I shall now address the more important reasons that allegedly prompted the merger 
of the two courts. 
2.2.2 Financial resources 
One of the major factors driving the merger was the lack of financial resources as 
proffered by many African human rights observers.82J Biegon agrees that finances 
were of concern to the extent that the African Commission for many years has been 
financially incapacitated. Despite the assistance of foreign funding, the African 
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Commission has remained cash strung.83Udombana argues that Africa’s 
supranational institutions suffer from chronic financial incapacity, and questions the 
African Union’s capability to provide the ‘proposed two courts with resources’. He 
goes on to conclude that the establishment of two courts seems overly ambitious.84 
The AU to a large extent relies on the Member States’ contributions to finance the 
operation of a number of institutions that fall within its purview, including those that 
were instituted under the mandate of the OAU. 
There seems to be a lack of commitment on the part of Member States to comply 
with their obligations to the AU with regard to paying their contributions.85The AU 
recognised the seriousness of the lack of funds and saw fit to impose sanctions on 
any Member State that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the budget of 
the AU.86 In May2003, a Voluntary Contribution Fund for African Human Rights 
institutions was discussed and incorporated into a document known as the Kigali 
Declaration in order to encourage contributions from Member States. A budget of 
US$ 2.25 million was proposed for the first operational year of the African Human 
Rights Court in 2007.87Despite the lack of funds in the AU, some African human 
rights observers did not consider this a valid reason for the merger of the courts.88 
2.2.3 Proliferation of courts with human rights jurisdiction 
African States are parties to a plethora of human rights treaties at the international 
and regional levels.89This study, as stated above, is biased towards human rights and 
is not concerned with other disciplines of law. The purpose of analysing the 
proliferation of courts is to demonstrate the extent to which human rights 
jurisprudence could come into conflict if not managed efficiently. 
Strictly speaking, there is no international Human Rights Court, and the closest 
mechanism to a court is the United Nations Human Rights Council, which is a quasi-
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judicial institution.90The International Criminal Court(ICC) has jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and human rights fall outside its 
mandate.91 The Court is competent to judge crimes committed on the territory or by 
nationals of the State. There are 30 African States that have ratified the ICC Treaty, 
acquiring Membership status and accepting the competency of the Court to preside 
over international criminal matters.92There will be an overlap of jurisdiction when 
the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute comes into force, and this 
potential conflict need to be addressed by Member State and the AU. 
The emerging economies in Africa have given rise to many regional and sub-
regional mechanisms and institutions. Eight Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs)have been recognised by the AU following a decision taken by the AU’s 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments.93African States are often members 
of more than one REC and there exists the possibility of conflicting competencies. 
Three of these recognised sub-regional institutions have judicial arms that are 
empowered with concurrent human rights jurisdiction to that of the African Human 
Rights Court and the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the proposed Tri-
Sectional Court, to protect and promote human rights.94The treaty establishing these 
institutions gives them a clear mandate to interpret the African Charter and other 
human rights instruments and, as argued by human rights observers, creates an 
opportunity for forum shopping.95The three RECs include the East African 
Community (EAC),the Economic Community of West African States 
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(ECOWAS)and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). They are 
composed of sub-regional courts of justice to promote and protect human rights and 
are vested with jurisdiction to pronounce on human rights violations. 
Members of the sub-regional institutions have acceded to the human rights 
incorporated and enshrined in these enabling instruments. The ECOWAS Treaty 
preamble enshrines the concept of promotion and protection of human rights as 
found in the African Charter. This is in terms of Article 4(g),which stipulates that 
human rights area fundamental principle of the Treaty.96Article 22(1) of the same 
Treaty declares that ‘no dispute regarding interpretation or application of the 
provisions of the treaty may be referred to any other forum for settlement except that 
which is provided by the Treaty or this Protocol’. The EAC Treaty contains similar 
adherence to the fundamental human rights principles. More particularly, Article 
6(2) of this Treaty relates to the obligations of the Member States to protect human 
rights in accordance with the African Charter. The Treaty empowers the EAC Court 
of Justice to interpret the provisions relating to human rights.97The SADC is 
empowered to establish a Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community with human rights jurisdiction. However, the 32nd SADC Summit of 
Heads of State and Governments confirmed the suspension of the SADC Tribunal.98 
Other sub-regional institutions are vested with express or implicit human rights 
jurisdiction. For example, included in the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, 
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance is paragraph 15, which refers to the 
protection and promotion of human rights. It further supports the African Charter, 
the African Commission and the African Human Rights Court. The African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) established by this Treaty seeks to promote adherence 
to and fulfilment of the obligations of Member States in the Declaration.99 The 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, established in 
July 2001, is empowered to receive State reports as well as communications from 
individuals, groups and recognised NGOs.100It is not clear to what extent these 
institutions will exercise their jurisdiction in making decisions on human rights 
violations and the relationship they will have with the proposed Tri-Sectional Court. 
                                                          
96
 See note 82 above Yerima at p.124. 
97
 See note 93 above. 
98
De Rebus, Law Society of South Africa October 2012. 
99
 See note 21 above Mubangizi at p.153. 
100
 See note 21 above Mubangizi at p.158. Also see note 83 above Beigon at p.228–230. 
24 
 
The conclusion of observers of African human rights is that ‘the mandate to interpret 
the African Charter and other international human rights instruments is not the 
monopoly of the African Human Rights Court or the Merged Court’.101Viljoen and 
Baimu argue that ‘[t]he proliferation of human rights institutions is likely to have a 
negative effect on the effectiveness of the efforts to promote and protect human 
rights on the continent’.102They further warn that overlapping mandates could run the 
risk of conflicting jurisprudence. Udombana supports the call for a single court and 
argues that ‘Africa does not need two or more courts and …the AU should settle for 
a single court to interpret all African legal instruments and adjudicate conflicts 
arising therefrom’.103 
There is a real concern that the various judicial institutions with similar jurisdiction 
may lead to forum shopping. While this may be so, it must be borne in mind that 
these judicial institutions will be operating at different levels. The sub-regional 
courts will have jurisdiction over those Member States within that region. The 
African continental human rights court has jurisdiction over all Member States 
irrespective of their affiliation to a sub-regional institution. This can be used to 
advantage rather than be considered an impediment, and can be developed in such a 
way that the African continental human rights court would have oversight on the 
sub-regional courts with regard to human rights issues. The AU must create a forum 
to engage with the sub-regional courts with regard to their human rights jurisdiction, 
given the fact that these institutions are here to stay. The negative perception of 
proliferation of judicial institutions and overlapping of human rights jurisdiction 
must be dispelled by adopting an inclusive strategy by the AU into the structure of 
the continental court.  
The sub-regional courts are not specifically established to have human rights 
jurisdiction and therefore may not have judges with the necessary expertise to 
consider violations of human rights. It is therefore of vital importance that such 
decisions would be subject to scrutiny by a judicial authority that has expertise in 
human rights matters. In other words, these sub-regional courts could be courts of 
first instance for those choosing to approach these courts subject to the right of 
appeal to the African continental human rights court. The danger of conflicting 
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judgments would also be addressed by subjecting the sub-regional jurisprudence to 
the scrutiny of the African continental human rights court. A system of hierarchy of 
courts would prevent forum shopping and would serve to lessen the workload of the 
African continental human rights court. However, this does not prevent victims from 
approaching the African Commission, which in turn, based on their merit, could 
refer human rights issues to the African continental human rights court the African 
Human Rights Court, or the Merged Court of the Tri-Sectional Court. 
The sub-regional institutions were primarily established to develop political and 
economic co-operation between Member States. The AU should foster cohesion 
among Member States with regard to economic and political development. This has 
the potential to impact positively on human rights protection in that violations would 
result in sanctions of a political and economic nature should the Member States fail 
to comply with the court’s decisions.104 Therefore, the merger of the African Human 
Rights Court with the Court of Justice, which has economic and political jurisdiction, 
would be expedient for the protection and promotion of human rights. To this end, 
the sub-regional institutions should be effectively used to promote and protect 
human rights in collaboration with the AU. 
However, proliferation within the AU poses a problem with the creation of various 
organs under its jurisdiction. This is so even when the organs are duplicated with 
overlapping mandates such as those which currently exist between the African 
Human Rights Court and the Court of Justice and which are empowered to determine 
human rights issues. This problem will resolve itself when the merger of these two 
courts comes into force. Technically, the African Human Rights Court is not an 
organ of the AU; nevertheless, it falls within its ambit of jurisdiction as a continental 
judicial mechanism. Secondly, as a result of the scarcity of financial resources, the 
existence of two judicial institutions with concurrent human rights jurisdictions will 
compete for such funds. This could be detrimental to the efficient operation of both 
mechanisms. In the circumstances, the proposal of a merger is very attractive, with 
the proviso that it is able to protect and promote human rights to its fullest extent.  
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2.3 Arguments against the merger of the court 
Not all African human rights observers considered finance and proliferation as valid 
reasons for a merger of the two courts. The experts at the Grand Bay meeting of June 
2003 also raised this concern.105They commented that a merger would relegate 
human rights to other issues on the African continent. 
Boukongou argues that the observers of African human rights who subscribe to ‘the 
doctrine of the merger’ do not explain the validity of such an operation. Their 
‘justification as to the lack of means or the institutional congestion of the AU seems 
to be a pretext for those who fear having to be forced to ratify the Protocol’ of the 
African Human Rights Court.106Boukongou argues further that the rationalisation of 
means and optimisation of costs masks a desire to bury the African Human Rights 
Court. He further argues that the consequence of the merger would result in a 
regression of the jurisprudence courageously developed by the African Commission. 
Wachira, another of the African human rights observers, has a similar view, and is of 
the opinion that the African Commission is ‘a body whose continued existence 
cannot be compromised except if the AU had a better alternative in mind to safe 
guard the rights of the African people on a continent rife with human rights 
violations’.107 
AU Member States addressed the issue of funding at length at the Grand Bay 
meeting of experts in June 2003, and voted against the merger. They argued that the 
insufficiency of adequate financial resources affected all African Union institutions 
and therefore should not be used as the rationale for merging the two courts.108In this 
regard, Du Plessis observes that the excuse of insufficient funds to argue the cause of 
a single court is not convincing as the very organisation, the AU, is solely 
responsible for providing the funds and ‘should be compelled to ensure that adequate 
resources are provided to render the African regional human rights system a 
meaningful and effective component of the overall regional framework’.109 Other 
observers such as Boukongou argue that the AU has created other organs that also 
require funds, such as the tedious Pan-African meetings, and question whether Pan-
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African bureaucracy ‘deserves more attention than an African Court on Human 
Rights’.110 
Observers of African human rights have expressed a fear that the merger of the 
courts will detract from the all-important emphasis of promoting and protecting 
human rights. An independent human rights judicial institution based on the existing 
international models in Europe and America is perceived to be the norm. Africa does 
not have the resources or the political commitment to maintain a separate Human 
Rights Court, given that Africa’s judicial need extends beyond the realm of human 
rights, which does not include peace, security and the rule of law. Another concern 
on the merger of the courts is that the enabling instruments do not cater for the 
termination of these mechanisms by the exclusion of relevant clauses that would 
facilitate the process.  
2.3.1 Legal requirements enabling the merger 
Neither the African Human Rights Court Statute nor the Protocol to the Court of 
Justice contains a termination clause. Although negligence or oversight cannot be 
ruled out, this omission could be the result of using as a model, clauses from prior 
instruments.111It has been argued that the drafters of these instruments or the 
Member States did not foresee that these treaties would in the future be terminated. 
The Vienna Convention is clear on the issue of termination and the fact that parties 
are bound by the treaties once they are entered into force by the pacta sunt servanda 
rule.112 In the absence of a termination clause in the treaties, the relief sought would 
have to be found in international treaty law, which is grounded in the Vienna 
Convention.113 The termination of a treaty may take place as a result of the 
application of the provisions of the treaty of the present Convention.114 Where a 
treaty contains no provision regarding its termination and does not provide for 
denunciation, unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility 
of denunciation, or a right of denunciation may be implied by the nature of the 
treaty, such treaty cannot be terminated.115 From the text, or the interpretation of it in 
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the context of the two protocols, the above requirements cannot be gleaned even 
under a generous interpretation. 
The Vienna Convention provides for two ways by which treaties can be terminated; 
one in terms of the provisions in the treaty in confirmation of the pacta sunt 
servanda rule, and the other at any time by consent of all parties after consultation 
with the other contracting States. Termination of treaties in the second instance will 
take effect only after these two conditions have been met. The consequence of 
termination of a treaty frees all parties from the obligation to continue with its 
execution. The OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act contain similar amendment 
and revision clauses, which are premised on the Vienna Convention.116 This is a 
clear indication that the drafters acknowledged the difference between the two 
procedures for the adoption of a review or amendment.  
It is argued that in terms of the Vienna Convention, the amendment clauses in the 
two protocols which are the subject of the merger cannot be invoked to terminate 
them; nor can they be used to merge the two. In situations where the treaty itself 
does not provide for its termination, then the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
are invoked, provided that valid circumstances for the termination exist. The 
question posed by commentators such as Kithure Kindiki as to whether a treaty can 
be used to abrogate another treaty is answered in the affirmative, in terms of the 
Vienna Convention.117 
From the above it is submitted that Member States Parties to both the African 
Human Rights Court and the Court of Justice can enter into a treaty to terminate each 
of the treaties individually, and thereafter enter into another treaty to merge the two 
courts into a single court. However, the decision to merge has to come from the State 
Parties and not from the AU Assembly, as is the case with regard to the present 
Protocol and Statute to the ACJHR. This is contrary to the provisions of the two 
protocols which are the subject of the merger and the provisions of the Vienna 
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Convention. The defect is addressed to some degree by the proposal to amend the 
Protocol to the Court of Justice to establish the ACJHR as the primary judicial 
institution of the AU.118 However, this is not sufficient to remedy the defect, given 
the fact that the African Human Rights Court is a treaty-based mechanism and is not 
a creature of the AU. To compound the problem further, the Court of Justice as 
envisaged originally by the AU is entered into force.119 
The enabling instrument of the ACJHR in its present form is not legal in terms of the 
law of treaties. The absence of termination clauses in both the protocols that is the 
subject of the merger could invoke the provisions of the Vienna Convention as 
mentioned above, and thereafter a new treaty could be entered into to establish the 
Merged Court. The Member States to the African Human Rights Court are not the 
same as the Member States to the Court of Justice, and vice versa. In the premises, 
the termination process must be conducted separately and independently to comply 
with the rule of law. Alternatively, the Protocol and Statutes to the ACJHR in its 
present form have to be abrogated by the AU and proposed by a State Party, and this 
must be consented to by all parties who are parties to the two protocols in order to 
give effect to the merger. This may prolong the operation of the ACJHR as 
envisaged by the AU, but it will conform to the rule of law. This will be in 
compliance with the Vienna Convention, and the AU’s credibility will remain intact. 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is evident that observers hold conflicting views on the ability of the AU to provide 
financial support for the African Human Rights Court. The African Human Rights 
Court is estimated to have expended more than US$12.5 million since its inception, 
and its annual budget is estimated at US$7 million.120 The AU, through the 
establishment of the ACJHPR, has assumed the responsibility of ensuring that 
adequate resources are provided for the advancement of human rights 
protection.121The fact that the AU has drafted a budget for the Merged Court is 
evidence that the AU is well aware of the funding requirements it has to meet. The 
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arguments put forward by some observers of African human rights that funding 
should not be used as a reason for the merger may have some merit, but no 
convincing reasons have been put forward to back up these arguments. It is true that 
the Human Rights Court is up and running despite the cries that it is inadequately 
funded, understaffed and has an adopted seat in Tanzania.122 The Court of Justice is a 
step away from becoming fully functional, although as stated above, the election of 
judges to this court has been suspended.123However, having to finance two separate 
institutions will no doubt increase the need for additional resources. Therefore, it 
would make economic sense to rationalise the number of institutions that fall within 
the ambit of the AU and thereby avoid duplication of costs. 
The AU Commission was entrusted in 2007 with the task of giving effect to the 
Kigali Declaration of 2003 by setting up the Voluntary Contribution Fund for 
African human rights institutions.124 At the eighteenth Ordinary Session of the AU 
Assembly of Head of States, a resolution was passed to urge Member States to pay 
up their contributions timeously and clear all arrears.125 This was a follow-up from 
the previous Session of the Assembly held in July 2011, when it had been tabled that 
the dire financial situation of the AU had been caused by delays in Member States’ 
honouring of their assessed contributions. The Assembly had further expressed deep 
concern over growing reliance on partner funds to finance the continent’s integration 
and development agenda.126 It would be left to the AU to fund the Tri-Sectional 
Court in the event that it became operational. 
The proposed inclusion of the international criminal law Section in the Merged Court 
has drawn criticisms from some observers of African human rights. Frans Viljoen 
makes a strong argument against the inclusion of this Section into the Merged Court. 
He argues for the separation of the international criminal court and the Merged 
Court. This is premised on the following reasons: the incompatibility of mandates 
between the general Section and human rights on the one hand, and the international 
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criminal law Section that the amendment seeks to add to the Merged Court on the 
other; the reluctance of States to ratify the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol 
and Statute, in particular States that favour the ICC and the African Human Rights 
Court; States that have had a negative experience with the African Human Rights 
Court and which will not ratify the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute; the shift of focus from human rights to international criminal issues and the 
systematic eroding of the prominence of human rights; and the added cost burden as 
a result of the inclusion of the international criminal law Section, which goes against 
funding reasons used to merge the courts.127 
It stands to reason that the budget of the Merged Court will more than double with 
the inclusion of the international criminal law Section, when compared to the budget 
of the African Human Rights Court.128It must be remembered when one institution 
expands to incorporate additional Sections, there will also be cost implications which 
may of necessity, or may not be, more than the cost of upkeep for two separate 
institutions. If merging the two courts without compromising human rights 
protection and promotion would help to lighten the financial burden, then merger is 
the route to pursue. However, the structure of the merger will determine if this will 
be the appropriate forum for the protection and promotion of human rights within the 
AU. Viljoen is not against the Merged Court being structured to include a general 
and human rights Section. What he is opposed to is the inclusion of the international 
criminal law Section in the Merged Court. He argues that such inclusion would be 
detrimental to the protection of human rights, as more emphasis will be placed on 
international criminal law at the expense of human rights. This study supports the 
argument as expounded by Viljoen and agrees that the general Section and human 
rights can coexist without one Section usurping the other. There is no reason to 
believe that the same cannot be said of the International Criminal Law Section being 
included into the structure of the Merged Court, save for the fact that in the 
international forum, this proposed Tri-Sectional structure is unprecedented. 
In support of this argument, one can examine the Constitutive Act and the Court of 
Justice Protocol to glean the intention of the AU regarding the inclusion of 
international criminal law in the court as a Section firstly of the Court of Justice and 
secondly of the Merged Court. As an example, one of the principles enshrined in the 
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Constitutive Act of the AU is ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’, African Union Members have 
entered into a Treaty of non-aggression and undertake to arrest and prosecute any 
irregular armed group(s), mercenaries or terrorist(s) who pose a threat to any 
Member State.129 
The AU deliberately provided for another court in the form of the Court of Justice by 
declaring it an organ of the AU to the exclusion of the African Human Rights Court. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the African Human Rights Court was adopted in 1998 
before the establishment of the AU in 2001. It cannot be said that the AU was 
unaware of the African Human Rights Court’s existence when the drafters saw fit to 
exclude it from the embrace of the AU and provide for another court. This 
demonstrates a clear intention on the part of the AU to leave the African Human 
Rights Court to operate independently of the Court of Justice. This can be further 
gleaned from the provisions of the Constitutive Act for the Court of Justice to have 
jurisdiction over general and international criminal law issues to the exclusion of 
human rights matters. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act confers a ‘right’ on the AU 
to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances. The same right is 
not conferred in respect of human rights save to ‘respect’ democratic principles, 
human rights, the rule of law and good governance in terms of Article 4(m).One of 
the objectives of the AU is clearly to promote and protect human rights in terms of 
Article 3(h).However, this is not reflected in the Court of Justice Protocol as 
entrusted by Article 18(2) of the Constitutive Act. The qualification of judges, 
eligibility to submit cases, jurisdiction and sources of law do not reflect any direct 
link to the protection of human rights. This can be drawn only from inference from 
the objective and principles in the Constitutive Act as referred to above, and the 
broad terms in which some Articles are couched in the Court of Justice Protocol, 
such as Article 19(2), which confers power on the Court to assume jurisdiction over 
any dispute other than that referred to in the Article, which is devoid of any reference 
to human rights. Unlike the Court of Justice Protocol, the African Human Rights 
Protocol clearly and unambiguously is engineered solely for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. 
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The AU saw fit to rectify this omission on its part, by accepting the proposal to 
merge the Court of Justice with the African Human Rights Court. This is proof 
enough that there was a lack of intention by the AU to include human rights in its 
court and for the African Human Rights Court to remain independent. However, this 
does not show that the proposed structure of the Tri-Sectional Court will be 
detrimental to the protection of human rights. 
The Merged Court Protocol and Statute is presently under consideration to be 
amended to change the court to the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.130 The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute empowers the 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights to have jurisdiction over 
international crimes.131 The structure of the Merged Court consists of two Sections, a 
General Affairs and a Human Rights Section.132 The Amending Draft Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute proposes three Sections: General Affairs, Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and International Criminal Law.133This supports the arguments of this study 
that the AU envisaged a court with general and international criminal jurisdiction to 
the exclusion of human rights. 
The AU was not to be the authoritative body with oversight of the Human Rights 
Court. It concentrated on the establishment of a general affairs and international 
criminal law judicial institution in the guise of the Court of Justice.134 The proposed 
merger of the African Court on Human Rights and the AU’s Court of Justice in the 
style of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights remedied the error and 
omission on the part of the AU. Observers of African human rights believe that the 
proposed draft would jeopardise the existence of the human rights Section, embodied 
within the new proposed amendment, to incorporate an international criminal law 
Section, as mentioned earlier in this thesis. The fact that the AU has suspended the 
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further process of the Court of Justice and has proposed the Merged Court is 
evidence that they have taken heed of the arguments of African human rights 
observers, and to a large degree, the comments of former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, as mentioned above. 
The stance of this thesis is that it is not adverse to a merger to rationalise costs and to 
avoid proliferation and conflicting jurisprudence on human rights issues. What the 
study explores is the proposed structure of the merger, which it argues may be 
structured without prejudicing its mandate for protecting and promoting human 
rights. Furthermore, the study reveals that the African Human Rights Court, if left in 
its present form, will stand outside the protection of the AU. It would be expedient 
for this court to be embraced by the AU to ensure the protection of the political clout 
that the AU affords. Furthermore, the status of the African Human Rights Court will 
be elevated from being out in the cold to ascending to the upper rungs within the 
structure of the AU. The Merged Court would bring with it the political clout of the 
AU to ensure compliance with the court’s decisions. 
The next chapter discusses the Merged Court Protocol and Statute so as to determine 
how the AU envisages the structural relationship in the merger between the African 
Human Rights Court and Court of Justice. This discussion will be linked with an 
examination of the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute in order to 
determine if some of the lacunae identified in the Merged Court Protocol and Statute 
have been addressed, and the effect the inclusion of the international criminal law 
Section will have on the human rights Section. A further assessment will be 
undertaken of the Merged Court Protocol and Statute, against the backdrop of the 
African Human Rights Protocol, to determine if the same protection of human rights 
afforded by the later Protocol is embodied in the Merged Court Protocol and Statute. 
More importantly, some of the provisions in the transition process affecting the 
structure of the Merged Court will come under scrutiny to make a determination on 
the perpetuation of the protection of human rights. Chapter Three will further discuss 
the pertinent Sections such as the composition of the court, qualification of the 
judges, access to the court, the nature of judgments and implementation mechanisms, 
jurisdiction and applicable law. This analysis will assist in the determination the 
providing an insight into how the AU through the enabling instrument of the Merged 
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Court addresses the concerns of the observers of African rights in order to protect 




AN ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The African Human Rights Court, as stated above, is the only continental court in 
African and the first ever human rights court with the power to pronounce binding 
decisions on Member States that violate human rights on the African continent. This 
Court was primarily established to complement the African Commission in attaining 
the objectives of the African Charter,135 and as such is an integral part of the African 
human rights protection mechanism. The Court is empowered with contentious and 
advisory jurisdiction in the interpretation and application of the African Charter, 
African Human Rights Protocol, and other Human Rights instruments ratified by 
Member States.136In order that this mandate may be fulfilled, eleven jurists with high 
moral character, of recognised practical judicial or academic competence, and 
experienced in the field of human and peoples’ rights are elected to this African 
Human Rights Court.137 The judges are elected on a part-time basis for a period of 
six years, save for the Judge President, who is elected on a permanent two-year term 
with the option of being re-elected.138 The administration duties of the Registry of 
the court are entrusted to a Registrar and other staff appointed in terms of the Rules 
of Procedure.139 
There is no uncertainty as to the applicable law in this court. All ambiguity is 
removed by the court being directed to apply the provisions of the African Charter 
and any other relevant human rights law ratified by the Member States.140 By 
implication, this will include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Direct accessibility 
to this Court is open to the African Commission, State Parties, African 
Intergovernmental Organisations (AIOs), and NGOs with observer status before the 
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African Commission.141 Individuals are restricted from directly approaching this 
court without the intervention of the State concerned.142 In this regard, the African 
Commission plays a pivotal role by providing a gateway for individuals to gain 
access to the African Human Rights Court. 
The structure of the African Human Rights Court as discussed above leaves no doubt 
that the court is crafted to provide maximum protection for human rights. However, 
this would be of no avail without the power of the court to make decisive and 
binding judgments in time of extreme gravity and urgency in order to prevent human 
rights violations, which the African Human Rights Court is empowered to do.143 The 
court’s decisions are final and not subject to appeal.144 The Council of Ministers and 
the Assembly of the AU have assumed the responsibility, in the place of the defunct 
OAU, of overseeing the implementation of the judgments and compliance with the 
orders to remedy the violation, including payment of compensation and reparation.145 
The African Human Rights Court is structured to provide maximum protection 
against human rights violations. Since becoming operational in 2006, the African 
Human Rights Court has received 21 applications, as at the end of 2012.146The 
under-utilisation of the court can be attributed to the fact that it is reliant upon the 
African Commission to refer applications to it. Other reasons, such as the lack of 
promotion of  and exposure to the African Human Rights Court to all its peoples on 
the continent has also contributed to the low number of applications received by the 
court. This could warrant the merger of courts, but if not done properly, such merger 
may pose a threat to the protection of human rights. 
This chapter will discuss the microstructure of the Tri-Sectional Court which 
includes the infrastructure, the core structure and the intellectual structure. The 
macro-structure will focus on the mechanisms outside the jurisdiction of the AU, but 
which have an impact on the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Tri-
Sectional Court for the protection of human and peoples’ rights. The source of the 
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analysis is the enabling instruments of the African Human Rights Court Protocol, the 
Merged Court Protocol and Statutes and the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol 
and Statute, including other relevant human rights instruments, whether they are 
universal, international or regional. 
 
3.2 The microstructure of the Merged Court 
3.2.1 Protocol and Statute of the Merged Court and Draft Amending Merged Court 
The first part of the enabling instrument of the Merged Court is the Protocol(Merged 
Court Protocol) which deals with the legal issues of the proposed merger including 
the transition process; while the second part, the Statute (Merged Court Statute) sets 
out the organisational requirements, jurisdictional competency, and procedural 
aspects, including Advisory Opinions of the ACJHR. Each part will be discussed 
separately and the lacunae identified will be checked against the Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute to verify if they have been addressed. 
3.2.2 Transition process 
The transition process sets the tone for the structure of the Merged Court. It 
determines the fate of the judges serving in the African Human Rights Court and the 
pending cases. It clarifies the position with regard to the existence of the Registry 
and continued employment of the staff presently with the African Human Rights 
Court. At the adoption of the Merged Court Protocol and Statute, the draftsperson 
did not envisage that the AU’s judicial institution in the form of the Court of Justice 
would be entered into force. This has resulted in a situation where provision has been 
made for the transition of only the African Human Rights Court and not the Court of 
Justice.147 Member States have seen fit to go ahead with the ratification of the Court 
of Justice in the full knowledge that there is a positive intention on the part of the 
AU to establish the Merged Court.148 As referred to above, this action demonstrates 
clearly that State Parties are in no great hurry to ratify the Merged Court into 
force.149The exclusion of the Court of Justice from the transition process shows that 
the AU overestimated the desire of State Parties and Member States to the Merged 
Court Protocol to see the Merged Court come into force. This could also be 
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attributed to the AU’s perceived intention to submerge the African Human Rights 
Court into the structure of the judicial organ it had created. This does not bode well 
for human rights protection, as it presents a serious structural defect in the Merged 
Court. The mere change of name from the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights to ACJHPR, as proposed by the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute, will not cure this defect.150 
A further indication of the African Human Rights Court being subsumed by the 
Merged Court is the approach adopted by the termination of the services of judges 
presently serving the court. Despite Article 4 being couched differently in the Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute, it does not address the position of 
judges who may be presiding over matters at the time when a new set of judges is 
sworn in to the ACJHPR. The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute 
makes provision for terminating the services of appointed judges to the African 
Human Rights Court at the point when judges are sworn in to the Tri-Sectional 
Court.151The terms of the African Human Rights Court judges must be extended to a 
date when matters over which they are presiding have been completed. This would 
avoid unnecessary time wastage and prejudice to the victims of violations. This is 
further compounded by the determination of how to dispose of pending cases. 
Article 6 of the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute provides for 
pending cases before the African Human Rights Court and the Merged Court to be 
concluded pursuant to the Rules of the ACJHPR. However, the Merged Court 
Protocol specifically provides for human rights cases to be concluded in terms of the 
African Human Rights Court Protocol.152 This avoids any confusion or uncertainty 
that the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute provision creates with 
regard to pending cases on human rights violations. The Draft Amending Merged 
Court Protocol and Statute creates an impression that it intends to discard any trace 
of the African Human Rights Court within the structure of the Tri-Sectional Court. 
This perception will impact adversely on the Merged Court’s ability to protect 
human rights. The only way to make sense of this provision on pending cases, Du 
Plessis and Stone argue, is ‘to read this provision into an acknowledgement or worse, 
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a prediction, on the part of the drafters, that the Merged Court is unlikely to become 
a legal reality for some time’.153 
A positive inclusion in the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute is 
security of tenure for the staff of the Registry of the African Human Rights Court. 
However, it neglects the staff of the Merged Court after acknowledging the 
possibility that this court may become operational before the ACJHPR is entered into 
force, unless it sees the Merged Court and the ACJHPR as being one and the same 
court, and there being no need to make such provision. If this were true, the question 
arises as to why provision should be made for pending cases from the Merged Court 
to be continued before the relevant Section of the ACJHPR. 
The transition process sends a clear signal that it intends to phase out the core 
structure upon which the African Human Rights Court is founded including the 
judges, Registrar and staff. The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute 
further seeks to dismiss the African Human Rights Court Protocol by directing that 
pending cases transferred from the African Human Rights Court be determined in 
terms of the Merged Court Rules, rather than the African Human Rights Court 
Protocol. 
3.2.3 The core structure of the Merged Court 
The Merged Court Protocol and Statute provides for sixteen judges of high moral 
character and in possession of qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices.154The Merged Court may recommend a 
review of the number of judges through the AU Assembly if required.155The Merged 
Court is divided into two Sections, a General Section, composed of eight judges, 
competent and experienced in international law; and a Human Rights Section, 
composed of eight judges with competence and experience in human rights law.156 
Judges are elected to serve on a part-time basis for a period of six years, except for 
the President and Vice President, who serve full-time for a three-year term.157Each 
Section may constitute one or several chambers, while a joint sitting from both 
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Sections with a quorum of nine Judges constitutes a Full Court.158 The Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute provides for a single Registrar with joint staff members and is 
silent on the term of employment. This structure will not diminish the importance 
and /or weaken the Human Rights Section as presently offered by the African 
Human Rights Court. Although there are some lacunae that need to be addressed, the 
protection of human rights will be secured by the continued implementation in the 
two Sectional Merged Courts. However, the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol 
and Statute does address some of the lacunae and, at first glance, appears not to 
strengthen or maintain the status quo of either the African Human Rights Court or 
the Merged Court. The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute by the 
nature of its structure seeks to redistribute the resources of the present Merged Court. 
It favours and includes additional personnel to the international criminal law Section. 
This creates a bias towards this Section of the Court.  
The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute provides for the Court to be 
divided into three Sections: General Affairs, Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 
International Criminal Law.159 The International Criminal Law Section is further 
divided into three chambers: a Pre-trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appellate 
Chamber. Observers of the African human rights system argue that the Tri-Sectional 
ACJHPR will be an added financial burden to the AU and furthermore, that more 
emphasis will be given to international criminal law than to human rights.160It is 
likely that the structural change to the Merged Court by the inclusion of international 
criminal jurisdiction161 will create a superstructure requiring more human and 
financial resources. The International Criminal Law Section proposes the 
appointment of a Prosecutor to serve for a seven-year term and two assistant 
Prosecutors, who will each serve a four-year renewable term. 
The core structure of the Human Rights Section is also under threat, as the sixteen 
judges will be divided among the three Sections disproportionately. The General and 
Human Rights Sections will both have five judges as opposed to eight in terms of the 
Merged Court Protocol, and six judges will constitute the International Criminal Law 
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Section. The allocation of judges to the Human Rights Section has been drastically 
diminished from eleven to five judges in the proposed Draft Amending Merged 
Court Human Rights Section. However, this may not have an adverse effect on the 
Human Rights Section in the future; as stated above, the number of judges may be 
increased upon recommendation of the Court. In addition, the Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute recommends that allocation of judges to the 
respective Sections and Chambers shall be determined by the Court in its Rules. This 
suggests that the Human Rights Section, should the need arise, on the 
recommendation of the Court may request the services of more judges. 
The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute has to a certain extent 
addressed the lacunae that positively affect the core structure of the Merged Court. 
There is a proposal for the term of judges to increase from six to nine years with the 
provision of being appointed on a permanent basis.162This provision is similar to that 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where judges are appointed on a 
permanent basis for a term of nine years and can be re-elected. However, there is a 
difference, in that all 47 States are represented in the ECHR judiciary.163The Draft 
instrument further ensures that judges are appointed with due regard to gender 
equality.164The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute is empowered to 
constitute an Appellate Chamber to hear Human Rights appeals, which are not 
provided for in the present Merged Court Statute, or the African Human Rights 
Protocol.165The Human and Peoples’ Rights Section is competent to hear all cases 
relating to human and people’s rights.166 The decision of this Section is subject to 
revision only on grounds of ‘new fact’, which fact was, when the judgment was 
given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision.167The Draft 
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Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute confers jurisdiction on the Appellate 
Chamber of the International Criminal Law Section, constituted by five judges who 
hear revisions and appeals.168The lack of clarity on human rights appeals, and the 
constitution of the Appellate Chamber with only International Law jurists, has 
attracted criticism from African human rights observers. Viljoen argues that this is 
inappropriate, as the Appellate Chamber is not well versed in human rights matters 
on the grounds of their expertise in international criminal law, and not international 
human rights.169Viljoen further argues that the difference between the mandate of the 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Court, which is one of State responsibility, and the 
individual criminal responsibility of the International Criminal Law Court, is 
incompatible. The incorporation of these two diverse functions in terms of 
responsibility and accountability is ‘unprecedented under international law’. This 
argument is valid, but it is surmountable, and can be cured with an amendment to 
include human rights jurists as constituents in the Appellate Chamber dealing with 
human rights matters. 
Provision is made in the proposed Draft to change the composition of the Registry 
drastically to support a Registrar and three Assistant Registrars. It does not, however, 
specify that an Assistant Registrar will be appointed to each Section of the Court, but 
this would be the logical reason for such appointment, and a step in the right 
direction. However, this proposed appointment of an Assistant Registrar to the 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Section strengthens the independence of this Section 
and bodes well for the protection of human rights. 
3.2.4 The infrastructure of the Merged Court 
The Draft instrument proposes transformation of the infrastructure of the Merged 
Court to such a degree that it would have an impact on the Human Rights Section. 
The seat of the Merged Court is the same as the African Human Rights Court.170 The 
addition of the International Criminal Law Section would require additional space, 
equipment, human and financial resources. The resources budgeted for the African 
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Human Rights Court will now be shared among three instead of two Sections of the 
Merged Court. This has the potential to place the AU under pressure to make 
additional resources available under difficult financial circumstances, as discussed 
above. The AU assumes responsibility for the budget of the Merged Court.171The 
financial impact on the Merged Court has been discussed in detail above. 
3.2.5 The intellectual structure of the Merged Court 
3.2.5.1 Access to the Court 
A contentious issue of access to individuals to the Merged Court has been addressed 
in the Draft instrument by indirectly including the African Commission within its 
structure. The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute confirms the 
complementary relationship between the Merged Court and the African 
Commission.172This to some extent secures the access of individuals to the Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Court. The Merged Court Protocol and Statute 
failed to make such provision, and the Draft instrument remedies this omission, and 
therefore strengthens the structure of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section with 
regard to the protection of human rights. The inclusion of the Section on the 
complementary relationship between the two human rights mechanisms adds weight 
to the protective mandate of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. Furthermore, 
NGOs are eligible to submit cases to the Merged Court through the African 
Commission despite the fact that the African Commission may not be an organ of the 
AU.173 
Observers of the African Human Rights system have criticised the lack of direct 
access to the African Human Rights Court and the Merged Court.174Article 8(3) of 
the Merged Court Protocol and Statute and Article 9(3) of the Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute set the terms of direct access to individuals on a 
prior declaration being ratified by the Member State. The other route available for 
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individual access to the proposed Merged Court is through the African Commission. 
Wachira argues that as a consequence, the African Commission will remain a 
tribunal of first and last instance in respect of the individual cases.175Commissioner 
Alapini-Gansou, as quoted by Viljoen, sees the African Commission as a filter that 
will ensure that only those cases that need to go to the African Human Rights Court 
will reach the Court.176Juma argues that in the absence of declarations by State 
Parties, the main gateway for individuals to the Court may be the African 
Commission. Article 30(b) of the Merged Court Protocol and Statute makes 
provision for the practical application of this access to individuals, where the African 
Commission is entitled to submit cases to the Court. It now remains with the 
ACJHPR to clarify and develop its relationship with the African Commission, as it is 
dependent on the African Commission to submit cases to it; or alternatively, on 
States submitting a declaration allowing for direct access to the Court.177 Direct 
access to the Human and Peoples Rights Section is made the responsibility of 
Member States. This places the onus on States to prove their commitment to the 
protection of human rights within their own territories and on the continent as a 
whole. 
However, Member States, the African Commission, the African Commission on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, African Intergovernmental Organisations (AIOs) 
accredited to the Union or its organs, and African National Human Rights 
Institutions (ANHRIs) are entitled to submit cases to the Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Section. 178 
It is important for individuals to be granted access as it is invariably individuals who 
are victims of human rights violations perpetrated by States. Human Rights NGOs 
play an important role in the protection of human rights by being a support base for 
these victims. They provide access to justice to victims who are not in any position 
financially or otherwise to take their complaints to court. They also play an 
important role in the promotion of human rights awareness. Given time, there exists 
a possibility that the AU will consider direct access by individuals to the Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Section, as is permitted in the ECHR. This possibility is further 
fortified by the fact that International Criminal Law seeks to prosecute individual 
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violators and this could be an argument to allow individual access to the other 
Sections of the Court. There also exists an option that should this individual access 
be granted, the role of African Commissions will come under review owing to cost 
implications. Declarations by Member States could, on the other hand, be an 
acknowledgement by Member States that they accept that power lies with and in the 
people. This is democracy in action and a confirmation that States are committed to 
human rights protection. 
3.2.5.2 Applicable law 
From a human rights perspective there is no specific reference to any human rights 
law that empowers the ACJHPR in carrying out its obligations. The court is 
empowered to have regard to the Constitutive Act, in which reference to human 
rights can be found only in its preamble, objectives and principles.179It is further 
required to have regard to international treaties, customary law and universally 
accepted principles.180 These catch-all provisions mean that the Court may enforce 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.181Viljoen and Baimu argue that 
inclusion of human rights in the Preamble is significant as it is an important 
interpretative material.182 Both the Constitutive Act and the Draft Amending Merged 
Court Protocol and Statute make express reference to human rights. The Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute and the Constitutive Act mention the 
African Charter. The fourth paragraph in the Preamble states that Member States of 
the African Union ‘[bear] in mind their commitment to promote peace, security and 
stability on the continent, and to protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant 
instruments’. Six of the 17 paragraphs of the Preamble make explicit reference to 
human rights. The Constitutive Act is the applicable law of human rights in terms of 
the provisions enshrined in its objectives. The AU is to encourage international co-
operation taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;183 promote democratic principles and institutions, 
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popular participation and good governance;184 and promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.185 These objectives are 
enhanced in the AU principles with the right of the Union to interfere in a Member 
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;186 promotion of gender 
equality;187 respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance;188 promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic 
development;189 respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of 
impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;190 
and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.191 
The African Human Rights Court Protocol explicitly makes the African Charter its 
primary source of law and other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
States concerned.192The African Charter is arguably the most important human rights 
instrument in Africa193 and as such must be an integral part of the Protocol and 
Statute to the ACJHPR. ‘The promotion and protection of human rights is a bedrock 
requirement for the realisation of the Charters vision of a just and peaceful world.’ 
These words uttered by Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General at the time, 
hold equally true for the African Charter and must take their rightful place within the 
AU. The AU must secure a legal base to incorporate the African Charter within its 
framework as mentioned earlier by acceding to the African Charter.194Gumedze 
argues: 
Acceding to a human rights instrument by the AU will also create a binding 
mechanism and give essence to the AU’s functional principle of respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance as provided 
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for in the Constitutive Act. It is also in this way that the responsibility to protect by 
the AU can be enforceable through a judicial or quasi-judicial process.195 
Article 34 of the Merged Court Statute provides for proceedings to be brought before 
the Human Rights Section. It specifically enshrines the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the Charter on the Rights on the Welfare of the Child, and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, and it includes in this mandate any other relevant human rights 
instrument ratified by the State concerned.196The Human Rights Section is mandated 
with jurisdiction to interpret the instruments mentioned above. These mandates, 
while granting the right to prosecute with regard to violations of these Treaties, do 
not give the African Charter and human rights law its rightful place as the applicable 
law. Its exclusion is a failure on the part of the AU to bring certainty to the 
protection of human and peoples’ rights. The AU must consider an amendment to the 
Merged Court Statute to include the African Charter specifically as the applicable 
law on human and peoples’ rights. Another consideration is that the AU should 
accede to the African Charter. These considerations would be a positive influence in 
the protection of human and peoples’ rights as they would be grounded in the rule of 
law, which is not the position at present. 
3.2.5.3 Judgments, decisions and implementation 
The African Human Rights Court is the result of years of lobbying and continued 
disregard for the authority of the African Commission findings. The African Human 
Rights Court is empowered to make binding decisions coupled with the power to 
determine the extent of the reparation to be made to remedy the violation.197 The 
Council of Ministers of the OAU/AU is instructed to monitor the execution of the 
judgment, and the State Party concerned is required to undertake to comply with the 
judgment.198 Failure to comply will result in the reporting of the defaulting State 
Party to the Assembly.199 No authority to impose a sanction is given to the 
Assembly. This has been remedied in the Merged Court Protocol and Statute. 
Most of the contents of the clauses pertaining to findings, judgment, notification and 
execution of judgments have been transported from the African Human Rights 
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Protocol into the Merged Court Protocol and Statute. The Executive Council is 
ordered to be notified of the judgment and to monitor its execution.200The Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute in Article 20 empowers the Rules of 
Court to establish principles relating to reparations to victims including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation.201This is an important aspect of the protection of 
human rights as it creates the opportunity for victims of human rights violations to 
regain some dignity.202 Even more reassuring is that the power imputed to the 
ACJHPR is the binding force of its decisions on the party concerned, and non-
compliance with a judgment would attract the imposition of sanctions on the 
violating State Party by the Assembly.203The Assembly is empowered to impose 
appropriate sanctions, such as denial of transport and communication links with 
Member States, including measures of a political and economic nature, on Member 
States that fail to comply with decisions and policies of the Union.204In terms of 
Article 35 of the Merged Court Statute, the Court is also empowered to impose 
provisional measures if circumstance so warrant.205 The decision of the Court is 
binding and the judgment is final. The offending State against which the judgment is 
given has the right of review and/or to appeal the judgment in terms of the Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute.206 
This sub-structure is the reason for the Human Rights Court being established. The 
cornerstone of the Court is founded on four pillars. The first is the power to make 
binding decisions on violators of human rights; the second the power to order and 
determine appropriate compensation and reparations to those who have been 
aggrieved, traumatised and dehumanised through acts of violence; and the third is 
the power to impose sanctions on the defaulting State found guilty of human rights 
violations. Finally, in the implementation and monitoring of its judgments, the 
ACJHPR enshrines this structure within its enabling instrument and acts in concert 
with the political arm of the AU with regard to implementation and monitoring of the 
decisions and the imposition of sanctions on violating States. This sub-structure is a 
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vital element within the microstructure of the ACJHPR for the protection of human 
and peoples’ rights. 
 
3.3 The macrostructure of the Merged Court 
The macrostructure of the proposed Tri-Sectional Court comprises of human rights 
mechanisms and institutions outside the ambit of the AU and which are not 
constituted as organs thereof. These mechanisms and institutions support and 
strengthen the microstructure of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section within the 
ACJHPR. The effective operation of these mechanisms will fortify the Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Section in the promotion and protection of human rights on the 
African continent. The African Commission, the sub-regional community courts and 
the national mechanisms make up the foundational macrostructure of the African 
human rights system, with the ACJHPR at its helm. 
3.3.1 The African Commission 
The African Commission is a treaty-created mechanism within the African human 
rights system. It is not an organ of the AU. However, the potential of this mechanism 
has been recognised by the AU by its inclusion into the structure of the ACJHPR. 
This has been discussed above. While the African Commission stays outside the AU, 
it remains an important component of the structure of the ACJHPR and the African 
human rights system as a whole. Its continued operation over the years has earned 
the respect of African human rights observers in the protection and promotion of 
human and peoples’ rights. 
3.3.2 The sub-regional mechanisms 
The proposed inclusion of the International Criminal Law Section in the Merged 
Court will no doubt shift the focus from the Human Rights Section. This is attested 
to by the extensive detailed emphasis on criminal law issues in the Draft Amending 
Merged Court Protocol and Statute. In particular, this Section of the Court extends 
its jurisdiction so that it becomes complementary to the National Courts and to the 
Courts of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).207 In so doing, the 
International Criminal Court embraces these macro-institutions within its structure. 
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This has the effect of strengthening the status of this Section of the Court and its 
awareness as the continent’s criminal mechanism with the might of the AU at its 
back to make pronouncements on war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. The inclusion of the International Criminal Law Section within the 
Merged Court gives effect to the provisions of the Constitutive Act.208 
This is where the Draft Amending Merged Court instrument fails to protect human 
rights: by its stark omission to include the various sub-regional community courts 
within the jurisdiction of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. This has been 
discussed above under the Section dealing with the proliferation of courts. The Draft 
Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute could propose that the same 
complementary jurisdiction include the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the 
ACJHPR. This would alleviate the concerns raised by observers of African human 
rights and strengthen the structure that protects human and peoples’ rights. A strong 
institutional linkage needs to be established between the sub-regional community 
courts and the ACJHPR under the framework of the AU. 
3.3.3 The national mechanisms 
The African Charter recognises that fundamental human rights stem from national 
and international protection.209The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute calls for the International Criminal Law Section to complement the national 
mechanisms on grave crimes, as mentioned above.210There is no such provision for 
the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section to complement national mechanism in either 
the Merged Court Protocol and Statute or the Draft Amending Merged Court 
Protocol and Statute. The development of national human rights mechanisms and 
institutions is fundamental to the support of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section 
of the Merged Court for the promotion and protection of human rights. The United 
Nations recognised this importance and adopted ‘Action 2’, a plan to strengthen and 
support the promotion and protection of human rights worldwide.211 In the UN’s 
quest to place human rights at the centre of its activities, ‘Action 2’ identified 
building of strong human rights institutions at country level as the principal objective 
of the UN, so as to strengthen national human rights promotion and protection. The 
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UN identified that to ensure effective and sustainable human rights protection at 
national level, it is crucial to have strong institutions that operate independently and 
adhere to international human rights standards. In so doing, the UN recognised the 
following important elements of a national protection system: laws consistent with 
international human rights standards; effective functioning of courts, judiciary and 
law enforcement as well as independent human rights institutions and an 
ombudsman; procedures for individuals to claim their rights effectively; and good 
governance and accountable government and institutions that promote and protect 
human rights, among others. It is apparent that the strength of the Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Section of the Tri-Sectional Court is the sum of national institutions 
grounded in human rights principles and guided by international norms and 
standards. It becomes imperative that the AU adopt a human rights-based approach 
which will strengthen the capacity of national human rights mechanisms and 
institutions to promote and protect human rights. 
Africa is the largest Regional Group within the UN, with 54 Member States that 
constitute 28 per cent of the total number of UN Member States. Africa holds three 
non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council, fourteen seats in the UN Economic 
and Social Council, and more importantly, thirteen seats on the UN Human Rights 
Council.212 This is significant for the protection and promotion of human rights in 
Africa in that all States are Members of the UN and subscribe to the global principles 
of human rights espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also 
important that all States, regardless of the political, economic and cultural systems, 
have a duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.213The support and development of ANHRIs is of vital importance because 
these institutions have been granted the right of access to submit cases to the Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Tri-Sectional Court. These institutions together 
with the national human rights courts form the base structure of the Merged Court’s 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. 
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3.3.4 African intergovernmental organisations and NGOs 
The African Human Rights Court,214 the Merged Court215 and the Draft Amending 
Merged Court instruments enshrine the structure of the ANHRI,AIOs,216NGOs217and 
RECs. These organisations form the grassroots structure of the Human Rights 
Section of the Court, which is vital to the promotion and protection of human rights 
on an individual basis. These institutions, despite being at the lower rung of the 
structure, are the foundation of the microstructure of the Draft Amending Merged 
Court’s Human Peoples’ Rights Section. AIOs are defined as organisations with the 
aim of ensuring socioeconomic integration, and to which some Member States have 
ceded certain competences to act on their behalf, as well as sub-regional, regional or 
intergovernmental organisations. There are no qualifying conditions attached to 
AIOs regarding representation of individuals at the African Human Rights Court or 
at the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Merged Court, or at the Tri-
Sectional Court’s Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. Individuals who are 
aggrieved by violations of their socioeconomic rights are not prevented from 
approaching the AIOs to intervene on their behalf at sub-regional, regional and 
international level, if their national structure fails them.  
An important component has been added to the grassroots structure in the Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Merged Court, in the style of ANHRI.218This is a 
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welcome addition as it does not require any accreditation to be eligible to submit 
cases to the Human Rights Section and to the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of 
the Tri-Sectional Court. This is a breakthrough for the promotion and protection of 
human rights, as individuals may be represented through these organisations, even 
though they may be part of the national judicial systems operating independently of 
the State Executive. It is vital that ANHRIs take full advantage of this opportunity 
and develop their infrastructure to an acceptable level of operation to receive and 
process individual complaints in their drive to promote and protect human rights. 
The limitations placed on NGOs and individual’s direct access to the Human Rights 
Section of the Merged Court219or the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the Tri-
Sectional Court220 could be removed in the future. NGOs and individuals could 
approach ANHRIs to represent them with regard to the Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Section of the Merged Court. NGOs could assist individuals to gain access to the 
ANHRIs. The ANHRI in turn can make itself accessible to both individuals and 
NGOs. AIOs have access to both sub-regional and the Merged Courts, which could 
be advantageous to individuals who have been aggrieved by human rights violations. 
These three organisations are an ideal breeding ground for the promotion and 
protection of human rights and should be exploited to their fullest by individuals and 
groups of people whose human rights have been violated. The effective utilisation of 
these institutions could lead to the reduction of complaints reaching the continental 
court for relief.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In the final analysis it can be said that the proposed Tri-Sectional Court has the 
necessary structures in place for the effective functioning of the Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Section of the Court. The inclusion of the International Criminal Law Section 
in the Merged Court will have an effect on the outlook of the Court, but it cannot be 
said that this will be detrimental for the promotion and protection of human and 
peoples’ rights. The planning, organising and developing of a cohesive relationship 
between the micro- and macrostructures of the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section 
has the potential to cause a greater awareness and impact on human rights promotion 
and protection on the continent. This would lead to the recognition of human and 
peoples’ rights grounded in the knowledge that the protection thereof has the backing 
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of a continental Human and Peoples’ Rights Court with the political might of the AU 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Conclusion 
The proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights will no doubt 
alter the landscape of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African 
Human Rights Court will now have to live and develop within the structure of the 
proposed Tri-Sectional Court, alongside the General Section and the International 
Criminal Law Section. There is no reason to believe that the proposed Draft 
Amending Merged Court which will house the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section 
will be subsumed or relegated in favour of either one of the other two Sections or 
both. The African Human Rights Court is the only continental court in operation as 
stated above. However, this does not grant it the status that it deserves, as it stands 
independent of the AU. The bringing of the African Human Rights Court within the 
fold of the AU will strengthen and give the Court the necessary political clout to be a 
judicial force to be reckoned with in the future, as far as the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the African continent are concerned. 
The African Human Rights Court will maintain its integrity despite losing its status 
as the only continental court. It retains its core structure, for example, with the 
proposed appointment of a human rights Registrar and qualified human rights 
judges. The proposed Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol does, however, reduce 
the number of judges to serve the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. This does not 
weaken the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section in anyway, or indicate that the 
reduction will have a detrimental effect on the capacity of the Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Section to process the number of cases brought before it. The African Human 
Rights Court since having become operational in 2006 has received only 21(twenty-
one) applications on human rights violations up to November 2012.221There is no 
specific reason attributable for the low number of applications to the African Human 
Rights Court. Some African human rights observers argue that the lack of direct 
access to the African Human Rights Court by individuals and NGOs could be 
responsible for this low number of applications.222However, in the event that there is 
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a need for more judges to cope with an increase in applications, the Merged Court 
Statute makes provision for the appointment of judges on the recommendation of the 
Court.223 
The political will of States Parties is crucial to the establishment of the Tri-Sectional 
Court. The intentions of State Parties to date have been clearly demonstrated by their 
ratification of both the African Human Rights Court Protocol and the Court of 
Justice Protocol into force in the face of the Protocol and Statute to the ACJHR, and 
more recently the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute. If this is 
anything to go by, this could be construed as a vote of no confidence in the Merged 
Court as the ratification of the Court of Justice came after the adoption of the 
Protocol and Statute to the ACJHR. Alternatively, there could be a lack of 
understanding in that the proposed Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and 
Statute poses no threat to human rights as a result of the dissolution of the African 
Human Rights Court. The reluctance on the part of State Parties to ratify the ACJHR 
may be exacerbated by the major amendments made to the Statute to the ACJHR by 
dividing the court into a Tri-Sectional institution.224 As noted earlier, sub-regional 
courts with human rights jurisdiction are operational. It stands to reason that State 
Parties which are members of the sub-regional treaties are subject to the human 
rights jurisprudence of these bodies. Member States to the African Human Rights 
Court (in the absence of a universal human rights court) and the ICC would be in no 
great hurry to ratify a protocol about which they may have misgivings. Furthermore, 
the issues surrounding the legality of the amendments may attribute to their 
reluctance to ratify the Merged Court Protocol and Statute. 
The question asked by this thesis is the whether the structure of the ACJHPR is the 
preferred judicial mechanism for the effective protection of human and peoples’ 
rights in Africa. All indications derived from the above analysis permit the 
conclusion that the proposed structure of the Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol 
and Statute, which includes a Tri-Sectional Court, will not be detrimental to the 
promotion and protection of human rights on the continent. In the final analysis, time 
alone will determine if the structure of the court as proposed will meet emerging 
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needs for the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights on the African 
Continent. 
4.2 Recommendations 
Human security, democracy, and prosperity can only be achieved in societies where 
fundamental human rights are respected. Humanity will not enjoy security without 
development; it will not enjoy development without security; and it will not enjoy 
either without respect for human rights.225 
The AU has to play a pivotal role in the promotion and protection of human and 
peoples’ rights in Africa. This role must be one that is grounded in human and 
peoples’ rights. Upholding human rights is one of the most effective ways of 
contributing to international security. A close relationship exists between human 
rights, democracy and security. The responsibility rests with each Member State to 
ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected for the benefit of 
its peoples. The AU should strive to fulfil its objective of promoting and protecting 
human rights by supporting and encouraging Member States to enshrine human 
rights into its national laws. The AU can only be as strong as the sum of its parts, and 
as such, Member States must take responsibility to protect their citizens vigorously 
against human rights violations and to take the lead in protection by enacting 
measures within their legislatures. Recalcitrant State Parties of human rights 
violations must be dealt with by the AU by way of imposing sanctions such as 
suspension of membership to the AU, despite the fact that States may not be Parties 
to the African Human Rights Court instrument. 
The transition process must be addressed to accommodate the Merged Court with 
regard to pending cases and appointed judges in order to ensure continuation and 
ensure that pending matters are finalised in terms of the African Human Rights Court 
in the areas from which they emanate. 
The Draft Amending Merged Court Protocol and Statute must consider the inclusion 
of human rights judges to sit in the Appeal Court. 
Clarity must be given in the Court Rules to the appointment of the assistant registrars 
in order to direct specifically that each Section must have its own Registrar. The AU 
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must not discount the effectiveness of advisory decisions of the Court in bringing 
States Parties to change and/or enhance their human rights laws. The Rules of Court 
may address this issue by granting either direct access to advisory services provided 
by the Court, or indirectly through the African Commissions to State Parties. 
The AU must engage with State Parties that have adopted a constitution which 
enshrines human rights to declare that their citizens and NGOs have direct access to 
submit complaints to the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section. Secondly, the AU 
must promote human rights where State Parties have not formalised human rights, 
and encourage them to declare individual access to the Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Section of the ACJHPR. 
A commitment to the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights will be 
positively demonstrated by the AU’s acceding to the African Charter and its 
inclusion as the applicable law on human and peoples’ rights. 
The ACJHPR must endorse its complementarity jurisdiction clearly to include sub-
regional economic community judicial mechanisms that have human rights 
jurisdiction. 
There is not enough discourse available on the merger of the two courts. The AU 
should allow Member States a reasonable time frame to assimilate and digest the 
ramifications of this decision to merge the two courts. The political will of both the 
AU and African States remains to be harnessed to protect and promote human rights. 
However, during the interim period of uncertainty, the African Human Rights Court 
must continue to be supported by the AU to dispel any misgivings about its status as 
a judicial mechanism operating outside the realm of the AU. The African Human 
Rights Court must be recognised by the sub-regional courts as the appeals court on 
human rights issues. Furthermore, African States should be encouraged to include 
the African Charter as an integral part of their domestic human rights laws, and the 
jurisprudence of the African Human Rights Court should not be treated as foreign 
law, and should be recognised by all African Member States as part of their 
jurisprudence.  
The AU must continue with its mandate to establish the Court of Justice which 
embraces a General Section and the International Criminal Law Section, as provided 
for in the Constitutive Act that was accepted, adopted and ratified by all African 
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States in 2001, so that the African Human Rights Court may continue to develop 
during the transition period.226 
ANHRIs must be encouraged to play a meaningful role within the Member States, 
sub-regionally and at the African Human Rights Court, not only by bringing 
complaints to the judiciary, but also by promoting and educating citizens on human 
rights. ANHRIs must become accessible to individuals and NGOs in order to bring 
complaints of human rights violations to the Merged Court when national 
mechanisms are unable to provide protection of peoples’ rights. 
The AU must adopt a human rights-based approach that will filter into regional and 
national legislation and judicial structures.  
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